In a typical public goods game (PGG), group members decide how much of their own resources to contribute to the common pool and the resources gathered in the pool benefit members equally. The difficulties of constructing a cooperative relationship are formulized as a public goods problem 1, 2, and many such studies are conducted in the social sciences.
#Free rider 3 free#
This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders-who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition.
We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader’s punishment. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. Here we introduce a “leader support system,” in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers.
However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Punishment of non-cooperators-free riders-can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG).
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