An increase of this size would likely be politically unsustainable, but this comparison highlights how profound and long-lasting the effects of its low defense spending will be.Īs it addresses shortfalls due to underspending, Japan will also need to build or acquire an extensive and expensive set of modernized and advanced systems, weapons, and infrastructure required for its self-defense against adversaries such as China and North Korea.įor example, Japan will need a reliable long-range strike capability and significantly increased numbers of long- and short-range air defense systems.
To fill this gap in the next five years, Japan would need to invest an additional 2 percent of GDP on top of planned increases just to offset one decade of underspending. For example, the difference between Japan allocating 1 percent of GDP to defense rather than 2 percent from 2012–21 amounts to foregone spending on the order of $500 billion (in 2020 U.S. Decades of low spending have left Japan’s defense force with aging physical infrastructure, low munitions stockpiles, old and insufficient air- and sealift and refueling capabilities, and too few personnel due to recruiting and retention issues.Ĭlosing this investment gap will be difficult and take time. This is below the 2 percent NATO benchmark and even further from regional counterparts such as South Korea, India, and Taiwan, each of which averaged about 2.5 percent of GDP per year over this same period. Over the past thirty years, Japan has maintained an annual defense budget of about 1 percent of its GDP. Japan faces a deep investment gap, and its currently planned budget increases are too small and gradual to address associated consequences in the near term. military assistance to Japan conditional on continued, larger increases in Japan’s defense spending in coming years. Washington will need to keep the pressure on Tokyo to stick to and even expand its defense investment further-for example, by making U.S. planning for regional deterrence and contingency operations or to lessen the U.S. Defense and State Department expectations that China may consider taking aggressive military action against Taiwan or elsewhere in the theater on an accelerated timeline, possibly before the end of this decade, Japan’s transition may be too slow to affect U.S. However, the Japan Self-Defense Forces-while more capable by 2027 than they are today-will likely still be dependent on the United States in many ways and limited in their ability to contribute to any regional crises well into the 2030s. military forces in the region and allow the United States to focus and prioritize its investments in Asia more effectively. For Washington, which is eager for more burden-sharing on efforts to deter Chinese aggression and respond to regional contingencies, these moves are encouraging: a Japan able to take responsibility for its self-defense would reduce demands placed on U.S. Japan’s new national security strategy explains how it will take primary responsibility for its own defense within five years and assume a far more active role in Indo-Pacific security. This will give the country the third-largest defense budget in the world. It intends to raise defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, or 60 percent over five years. Japan’s new commitments are undoubtedly significant.
Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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